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Bodily sensations, such as pain, hunger, itches, or sexual feelings, are commonly characterized 
in terms of their phenomenal character. In order to account for this phenomenal character, 
many philosophers adopt strong representationalism. According to this view, bodily sensations 
are essentially and entirely determined by an intentional content related to particular 
conditions of the body. For example, pain would be nothing more than the representation of 
actual or potential tissue damage. In order to motivate and justify their view, strong 
representationalists often appeal to the reliable causal covariance between bodily sensations 
and certain kinds of bodily conditions or to the corresponding biological function that these 
bodily sensations are supposed to fulfill. In this paper, I argue on the basis of recent empirical 
research that arguments from reliable causal covariance and biological function cannot 
motivate the introduction of corresponding intentional content. In particular, I argue that 
bodily sensations are caused by a heterogeneous class of physiological and psychological 
factors and their biological functions are too diverse to be reduced to the representation of a 
particular bodily condition. Responses are available to strong representationalists, but they 
either require substantial alterations to their core assumptions or incur a significant empirical 
burden. 
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Humans undergo a variety of mental phenomena that are characterized by phenomenal 
character, that is, by “what it is like” to undergo the respective experiences from a first-person 
perspective. There is something it is like to see a black cat, to smell rotten meat, or to feel a 
headache. Strong representationalist theories assume that this phenomenal character is 
essentially and entirely determined by intentional content (e.g., Byrne, 2001; Dretske, 1995; 
Tye, 1995). Intentionality is the property of mental phenomena which represent existent or 
non-existent objects, events, or states of affairs. According to strong representationalism, 
similarities and differences in phenomenology neatly correspond to similarities and differences 
in intentionality. Strong representationalism is attractive because it enables the reduction of 
phenomenal character to intentional content which is a naturalistically speaking unproblematic 
entity.1 
Strong representationalist theories often focus on exteroceptive sensations, but the general 
framework is supposed to account for various kinds of phenomenal experiences, including 
bodily sensations such as pain, hunger, itches, or sexual feelings (Bain, 2003; Byrne, 2001; 
Cutter, 2017; Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995, 2007). Accordingly, bodily sensations are supposed to 
represent objective conditions of the body. For example, pains and their introspectable features 
are taken to be nothing over and above the representation of a particular bodily condition, 
usually tissue damage or physiological disturbance (Bain, 2007; Cutter, 2017; Tye, 2005). Due 
to their intentional content, bodily sensations supposedly possess correctness conditions in 
terms of whether or not the represented bodily condition corresponds to physical reality (e.g., 
Bain, 2007). For example, a pain is veridical if the subject’s body is damaged or disturbed and 
it is non-veridical if not. 
Opponents of strong representationalism primarily ground their objections in introspectable 
features. In particular, they emphasize that bodily sensations present themselves subjectively 
as sensations that do not point to anything beyond themselves (Aydede, 2017, 2019; McGinn, 
1996). Irrespective of whether such objections are conclusive (Cutter, 2017; Gozzano, 2019; 
Tye, 2017), they underestimate the argumentative power of the strong representationalist view. 
Many strong representationalist arguments do not rely on the introspectable features of bodily 
sensations, but on their external relations to preceding bodily conditions (e.g., Bain, 2007; 
Cutter, 2017; Cutter & Tye, 2011; Tye, 2005, 2007). Bodily sensations represent bodily 
                                                          
1 The assumptions outlined in the previous paragraph are common to strong representationalism and strong 
imperativism. Both are grouped together as versions of strong intentionalism. The paper focuses primarily on the 




conditions because they are supposed to occur in the presence of these bodily conditions (see 
also Coninx, 2020a). Two closely related though not identical lines of argument support this 
assumption: 
Reliable Causal Covariance: bodily sensations represent particular bodily conditions 
because they causally co-vary in a reliable manner. For example, the causal covariance 
between pain and tissue damage is commonly taken to be very high. Misrepresentations, 
that is, non-veridical representations, are possible, but they are supposed to be rare 
exceptions.2 
Biological Function: bodily sensations represent particular bodily conditions since 
their naturally acquired biological function consists in the representation of exactly these 
bodily conditions. For example, pain represents tissue damage because the pain system 
was designed (by natural selection) to causally co-vary with tissue damage (e.g., Cutter, 
2017; Cutter & Tye, 2011). Misrepresentations, i.e., non-veridical representations, are 
possible, but they fail to provide the innate biological benefit that the relevant bodily 
sensation is supposed to provide. 
The aim of this paper is to challenge both arguments. Building on empirical research, I show 
that neither strong representationalist argument can motivate the introduction of an intentional 
content accounting for the phenomenal character of bodily sensations. My reasoning turns on 
the heterogeneity of the causes and biological functions of pain, hunger, itches, and sexual 
feelings. Bodily sensations are the result of diverse physiological and psychological conditions 
and their biological function is, in various cases, detached from the veridical representation of 
a particular bodily condition.3 
                                                          
2 Strong representationalists do not provide an unequivocal condition indicating how strong the causal covariance 
must be between a certain bodily sensation and a certain bodily condition in order to motivate the introduction of 
a corresponding intentional content. In this paper, I assume that the required reliability must be relatively strong 
in order to provide a convincing argument in favor of strong representationalism. Accordingly, misrepresentations 
are supposed to be rare exceptions. This strong criterion corresponds to some of those works that have had a 
lasting effect on the intuitions underlying representationalist theories (e.g., Pitcher, 1970), while it might seem too 
demanding to other authors relying on arguments of causal covariance (e.g., Hill, 2017). As already mentioned, 
the problem is that it is not clearly determined what it means that, for example, pain under normal circumstances 
occurs together with tissue damage. Thus, the obligation to argue for an alternative criterion lies with strong 
representationalists, especially as the assignment of a clear cutoff for reliable causal covariance constitutes a 
general challenge for the plausibility of their position. Many thanks to the two anonymous reviewers who 
challenged and defended my paper on this aspect. 
3 I do not aim to show that bodily sensations differ in this regard from exteroceptive sensations of vision, audition, 
taste, smell, and touch. Further investigation must decide whether strong representationalism can convincingly 
motivate the introduction of an intentional content for exteroceptive sensations on the basis of reliable causal 





In what follows, I primarily focus on pain. Most strong representationalists outline their 
theories in reference to this paradigmatic example case. Four points of clarification concerning 
pain and its intentional content are to be made in advance. 
First, in accordance with defenders (Bain & Brady, 2014; Cutter, 2017) as well as opponents 
(Aydede, 2000) of strong representationalism, I understand pain as a particular bodily sensation 
and not as the opposite of pleasure. Pains are not identical to mental phenomena of negative 
affective valence. Pain is a bodily sensation that is typically experienced as unpleasant, but 
there are unpleasant experiences that do not count as pains, including other bodily sensations 
(e.g., itches or hunger), exteroceptive sensations (e.g., the smell or taste of rotten meat), and 
emotions (e.g., grief or depression). Even if we assume that pains are necessarily unpleasant 
(Bain, 2014), unpleasantness is not the distinctive mark of their phenomenal character (Bain & 
Brady, 2014). I therefore accept that the intentional content of pain itself does not have to 
account for any affective features. In what follows, I will focus solely on pain and its sensory 
features.4 
Second, I take strong representationalism to hold that pain represents tissue damage, though 
most authors offer alternative bodily conditions (Bain, 2007; Cutter, 2017; Tye, 1997). The 
notion of tissue damage ideally captures the intuition that there is something specific about the 
bodily condition that is causally or biologically related to pain. This is of utmost importance. 
Hunger, itches, and sexual feelings possess phenomenal characters that deviate from the 
phenomenal character of pain. Bodily sensations possess a unique phenomenal character and, 
as such, they must represent different bodily conditions. I assume that this is common ground 
with strong representationalists who aim to account for pain, hunger, itches, and sexual feelings 
as distinct phenomena related to distinct bodily conditions (e.g., Tye, 1995, 2007). 
Third, I acknowledge that pain represents actual as well as potential tissue damage (Raja et 
al., 2020). I include cases in which the body is already damaged as well as cases in which the 
                                                          
respect to all exteroceptive sensations. For example, there is an active debate about what olfactory sensations 
represent and whether they represent any particular objective condition at all (Carvalho, 2014; Castro & Seeley, 
2014; Cavedon-Taylor, 2018). 
4 In everyday life, it may seem difficult, if not impossible, to separate sensory and affective aspects, as we typically 
experience them as an integrated unit. Especially cases of pain asymbolia have contributed to the now widespread 
assumption that sensory and affective features of pain can, in principle, occur independently (Bain, 2014; Corns, 
2014; Grahek, 2007; Klein, 2015). For the sake of the envisaged argument, I will presuppose that this assumption 
is uncritical. Furthermore, it should be noted that in order to account for the affective features of pain, some strong 
representationalists introduce a second evaluative content (Bain, 2013, 2017). According to this view, the 
intentional content of unpleasant pains is composed of the representation of a certain bodily condition plus the 
representation of this bodily condition as bad for the subject. Whether strong representationalism can conclusively 
account for the affective features of pain and other mental phenomena must be the subject of independent debate 




body is dangerously close to being damaged in the near future (Hall, 2008; Pitcher, 1970). For 
example, I take it that a pain that is caused by a source of increasing pressure veridically 
represents damage even if this damage is not yet present but likely to occur at any moment. 
Moreover, I assume that it is only when subjects experience pain that this pain is supposed to 
be reliably caused by actual or potential damage or to reveal the biological function of 
representing damage (Hill, 2012; Pitcher, 1970). Considerations concerning the absence of pain 
in the presence of tissue damage, or concerning the biological connection between other mental 
phenomena and tissue damage can thus be put aside.  
Fourth, although the presupposed intentional content need not determine the affective 
features of pain, it must account for its sensory features. Strong representationalists commonly 
assert that pains possess felt location and intensity (Cutter, 2017). Some pains are felt as being 
located in the joints, others in muscles or inner organs. Some pains are felt as moderate in 
intensity, others as mild, and yet others as severe. The intentional content of pain must account 
for these differences in phenomenology. Most strong representationalists consider the felt 
location of pain to represent the body area in which tissue damage is located (Bain, 2007; Tye, 
2005), while the felt intensity of pain seems to represent the severity of damage (Cutter, 2017; 
Hill, 2012).5 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I focus on the argument from reliable causal co-
variance. I show that non-veridical representations are not rare exceptions from the norm. This 
is due to the heterogeneity of causal factors that affect pain and its sensory features. In Section 
3, I show that this applies in a similar manner to the biological function of pain. The biological 
benefits that pain provides are too diverse to be plausibly characterized by the representation 
of actual or potential tissue damage. In Section 4, I extend my conclusions concerning pain to 
other bodily sensations of hunger, itches, and sexual feelings. Although each bodily sensation 
has idiosyncratic characteristics, all prove resistant to strong representationalist arguments 
from reliable causal covariance or biological function. In Section 5, I discuss possible strategies 
for strong representationalist responses. I argue that each strategy comes at a high price while 
none proves to be particularly attractive for defenders of strong representationalism. Section 6 
summarizes the results of my investigation. 
 
 
                                                          
5 For the sake of simplicity, I will neglect so-called sensory qualities (e.g., pulsing, burning, aching, stinging, or 




2. Reliable Misrepresentations 
If pain reliably co-varies with actual or potential tissue damage, then misrepresentations should 
be rare exceptions to the norm. Strong representationalists assume that pain does reliably co-
vary with a distinct bodily condition, so they have the burden of empirical proof. Unfortunately, 
such proofs are not be found in the literature, where intuitions play a driving role. This might 
be due to the lack of comprehensive statistical analyses of pains and their occurrence in the 
absence or presence of tissue damage.6 Notwithstanding, I aim to show that empirical studies 
reinforce significant doubts about a reliable causal covariance between pain and tissue damage. 
Recent research indicates that cases in which pains occur in the absence of tissue damage 
cannot be considered rare exceptions in any plausible sense. I argue for this claim on the basis 
of three facts.7  
First, misrepresentations prototypically occur in chronic pains (Corns, 2014). Many chronic 
pains are characterized by the occurrence of pain in the absence of a corresponding actual or 
potential damage because they rely on alterations to the peripheral or central nervous system 
(Apkarian, Baliki, & Geha, 2009; Treede et al., 2019). Although most types of chronic pain, 
such as phantom pain or fibromyalgia, occur as separated phenomena in a small group of the 
population, the total number of people with such conditions should not be underestimated: 
persisting pains affect, on average, about 20% of the population (Breivik et al., 2006; 
Dahlhamer et al., 2018). As such, the number of such cases exceeds the number of analogous 
chronic conditions considered to be non-veridical representations of exteroceptive sensations. 
For example, chronic tinnitus affects, on average, “only” 10% of the population (Bhatt, Lin, & 
Bhattacharyya, 2016). 
Second, episodic pains can occur in the absence of actual or potential tissue damage. 
Relatively common in everyday life is, for example, the acute fast-fading occurrence of muscle 
pain during or immediately after performing physical activities. Although different factors, 
such as metabolic processes, are involved in the generation of this pain, no actual bodily 
damage is known that could be assigned as its cause (Miles & Clarkson, 1994). Subjects also 
                                                          
6 Data available from hospitals or physicians cannot provide the required basis for such analyses because various 
pains experienced in everyday life, such as the pain of cutting a finger on paper, are not systematically collected. 
Subjective reports alone do no better because laypeople often cannot adequately evaluate whether an experience 
of pain is caused by tissue damage or not. 
7 In the past, similar objections concerning dissociations between pain and tissue damage have been brought 
forward (Coninx, 2020a; Corns, 2014; Klein, 2015, 2017). In this section, I aim to connect these objections on the 
basis of recent empirical data and extend them in light of examples that have thus far received too little attention 
(e.g., visceral pains). In the upcoming section, I also close possible loopholes for strong representationalists in 




start to experience the pain of physical exertion long before any potential damage could occur 
in the muscles or before the body collapses from exhaustion (Klein, 2017). During the 
performance of physical activities, subjects cannot be constantly close to suffering from some 
sort of tissue damage, given that most physical activities do not lead to such a result. Even the 
sore muscle pain which comes after a delay of hours or days after physical activity is not 
necessarily associated with muscle damage or inflammation, as scientists had believed it was 
for a long time (Mizumura & Taguchi, 2016; Murase et al., 2010). 
Third, the sensory features of location and intensity do not fit well with the relevant 
physiological features of tissue damage. This makes a reliable causal covariance between the 
intentional content of pain and the objective condition of the subject’s body even less plausible. 
Multiple cases expose the systematic mismatch between the physiological features of tissue 
damage and the sensory features of pain. Problems of location and intensity will be discussed 
in turn. 
The location of tissue damage does not always neatly correspond to the location in which 
pain is experienced. Visceral pains are particularly interesting and pressing cases because they 
constitute one of the largest subclasses of pain (Halder & Locke III, 2009). Visceral pains are 
often experienced as vaguely located, although they often have a precise point of origin (Strigo 
et al., 2002). Pain in the intestine might be caused by a spasm of a certain muscle or by the 
inflammation of a particular segment, such as the appendix. Meanwhile, the subject 
experiences pain across a larger area of the lower abdominal region. The represented location 
might include the actual location, but it fails to represent the exact spatial features of tissue 
damage. One might reply that it is sufficient that the represented location includes the actual 
location of tissue damage. This reply entails implausible consequences. For instance, people 
who experienced pain in their entire body would veridically represent a tissue damage located 
in the fingertip. One might further debate the degree of vagueness that should be admitted when 
the felt location of pain differs from the objective location of damage; however, in the absence 
of a clear criterion that distinguishes veridical from non-veridical representations, strong 
representationalism loses its argumentative strength.  
The list of cases in which the felt intensity of pain fails to correspond to the severity of the 
corresponding tissue damage is almost endless because many different factors have an impact 
on subjective intensity (e.g., Apkarian, 2017; Brooks & Tracey, 2005; Bingel & Tracey, 2008; 
Ploner, Bingel, & Wiech, 2015). Sensory intensity is affected by various interoceptive and 
exteroceptive signals. For example, simultaneous vibration can decrease and increase the felt 




Similarly, seeing one’s own body in contrast to a neutral object reduces pain intensity (Longo 
et al., 2009). Psychological factors also have an impact on the intensity of pain. For example, 
the expectation of pain relief (Howick et al., 2013) and social support from significant others 
(Brown, 2003) leads to a decrease in the intensity of pain. On the other hand, anxiety (Rhudy, 
2016) and the subjective anticipation of future pain (Keltner, 2006) lead to an increase in pain 
intensity. Given the systematic influence of such common factors on the felt intensity of pain, 
the chance that it neatly corresponds to the severity of tissue damage becomes very small 
(Coninx, 2020a).8 
In sum, these insights indicate that pain is related to a heterogeneous class of causes. There 
is no unilinear relation between pain and tissue damage, as many philosophers assume. 
Consequently, the focus on tissue damage constitutes a significant oversimplification of the 
causal relations involved in pain. Interestingly, this has been uncontroversially accepted by 
scientists across academic disciplines, such as psychology, neuroscience, and clinical medicine 
(e.g., Gatchel et al., 2007; Hadjistavropoulos, 2017; Melzack & Wall, 1982). If we take these 
empirical results seriously, so-called non-veridical representations can hardly be considered to 




In the previous section, I provided evidence that pain and tissue damage do not causally co-
vary in a reliable manner. This objection does not necessarily affect the second line of argument 
brought forward by strong representationalists: namely, pain represents tissue damage because 
it is its biological function to do so. Accordingly, pain is supposed to reliably co-vary with 
tissue damage, at least under those conditions for which pain was naturally designed. In order 
to make this argument work, strong representationalists must assume that the naturally acquired 
function of pain relies on a “better-safe-than-sorry” principle (Millikan, 2004). That is, to 
account for frequently occurring misrepresentations, strong representationalists must assume 
that residual veridical representations increase the probability of survival overcoming the 
biological costs brought about by non-veridical representations.  
This assumption has two important implications. First, those cases in which pain and its 
sensory features dissociate from tissue damage and its physiological features must be false 
alarms that do not contribute, by themselves, to the biological benefit that pain generally 
                                                          




provides. Only veridical representations fulfill the biological function that pain was naturally 
designed for. Second, the ecological costs of pains must be relatively low. Otherwise, it is 
unlikely that the biological benefits of veridical representations overcome the biological costs 
of non-veridical representations, especially as misrepresentations are not rare exceptions. In 
this section, I argue that both implications are implausible. 
First, those pains that do not veridically represent tissue damage are supposed to constitute 
false alarms that fail to provide the innate biological benefit for which pain was naturally 
acquired. Most plausibly, this biological benefit is somehow grounded in the promotion or 
protection of the subject’s bodily integrity (Williams, 2017). Accordingly, non-veridical 
representations do not contribute by themselves to the physiological well-being of the subject. 
The classification of manifestations of chronic pain, such as phantom pain or fibromyalgia, as 
“pathological” appears plausible because they fail to provide any biological benefit.9 This does 
not necessarily apply to all pains labeled as non-veridical (Coninx, 2020a; Klein, 2015). Many 
promote the physiological well-being of the subject even though they are not veridical 
representations of actual or potential tissue damage. 
Pains felt during or immediately after physical performance are not associated with actual 
or potential tissue damage. Instead, they seem to function as indicators for the subject’s level 
of exertion. Identifying the level of exertion is relevant for the subject’s ability to function at 
the edge of their bodily limits without collapsing or underloading. For instance, the 
introspective rating of physical exertion proves to be highly useful in promoting muscle growth 
and gaining physical strength (e.g., Borg, 1998; Helms et al., 2018; Zourdos et al., 2016). 
Moreover, muscle pain might prevent the subject from depleting the physical resources 
required for the performance of other survival-relevant activities, such as fighting and fleeing.10 
Visceral pains are not made less adaptive by their failure to represent the precise location of 
tissue damage. In many cases, subjects cannot act on the relevant body part in a precise manner, 
as the muscles of inner organs are not under voluntary control. Notwithstanding, visceral pains 
still contribute to the promotion and protection of a subject’s bodily integrity. For example, in 
the case of intestinal pain, subjects often massage or warm their entire lower abdominal wall. 
                                                          
9 It is uncontroversial that these pains constitute pathological disorders. This does not mean that they are 
pathological because they are non-veridical representations. 
10 The case of delayed muscle soreness is more difficult because it is still up for debate what biological function 
it might serve. Some authors ascribe a warning function which demands the limitation of movement; others 




This behavior can be adaptive by increasing the blood flow and relaxing spastic muscles, 
irrespective of their exact location. 
Strong representationalists must account for all the factors that affect the felt intensity of 
pain besides tissue damage. According to their position, these factors must be considered as 
debilitating or distorting because they prevent the subject from veridically representing the 
severity of the damage (Hill, 2012). In contrast, it appears to be beneficial that the experience 
of pain is shaped by stimuli from multimodal sources. In particular, both interoceptive and 
exteroceptive signals provide information about the body’s condition and one’s possibilities 
for acting upon it. For instance, the influence of visual signals might be functionally grounded 
in the fact that they allow the subject to identify and control the pain-causing stimuli, at least 
in the case of superficial pains. In the presence of the same tissue damage, differences in felt 
intensity can also be beneficial in light of varying emotional contexts. For instance, it appears 
adaptive that subjects react in different manners when they experience themselves as being in 
a safe environment versus a dangerous one, as these environments demand different reactions.  
Second, I note that the “better-safe-than-sorry” principle is prototypically associated with 
reflexes, such as the eye-blink reflex (Millikan, 2004). The biological function of the eye-blink 
reflex seems to be adequately described as promoting the protection of the eye, given that, for 
this kind of automatic reaction, the positive outcome of a few correct reactions outweighs the 
quite low energy and resource costs of many false alarms. The “better-safe-than-sorry” 
principle might work for various phenomena. However, we have reason to doubt that this 
applies to pain because its biological costs are exceptionally high.  
Pain demands attention, interrupts cognitive processes, limits movements, influences 
motivational focus, and brings about an emotional burden (e.g., Apkarian, Bushnell, & 
Schweinhardt, 2013; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Hadjistavropoulos, 2017; Melzack & Wall, 
1982). This is the reason why pain has such an immense impact on the quality of life of 
concerned subjects (e.g., Ilgen et al., 2010). The biological benefit of pain must not only be 
compared to the negative effects of those cases in which people fail to experience pain in the 
presence of tissue damage, but one must also take into account the ecological effects of every 
case that the representational view labels as a non-veridical representation. A process with such 
high production costs as pain should, in general, be successful rather than unsuccessful in order 
to reduce the waste of energy and resources relevant for survival (Klein, 2015). The rare 




It should be noted that ecological costs are not identical to disadvantages. A system with 
high ecological costs can be adaptive, given that its general outcome brings about a 
corresponding biological benefit, and I certainly agree that pain provides such benefit. 
Nonetheless, given that pain has high ecological costs, it appears implausible that it would 
work on a “better-safe-than-sorry” principle.11 
In reply to these objections, strong representationalists might argue that pain originally 
evolved as a system for damage indication while the adaptive function of false alarms emerged 
later as a beneficial side-effect. This form of functional re-use is frequently labeled exaptation. 
Applying this concept to pain offers the opportunity to define the biological function of pain 
as the representation of tissue damage. It allows misrepresentation to be considered beneficial, 
though with respect to an additional benefit that non-veridical representations developed later 
on. This solution has several problematic implications, however. 
For the solution to work, multiple processes of exaptation must have taken place. We do not 
merely need to assume that, for instance, the pains of physical exertion have found an additional 
adaptive function. The influence of all those physiological and psychological factors 
responsible for misrepresentations of the severity of tissue damage must also have developed 
through separate processes of exaptation. This multiplicity makes the proposed solution seem 
ad-hoc, and its defenders must provide more sequentially differentiated evidence. In addition, 
this solution is necessarily based on the assumption that pain evolved in organisms at an early 
evolutionary stage, and that the pain system of these organisms is exclusively related to tissue 
damage. This attempt to save the argument from biological function to strong 
representationalism thus comes with huge empirical burdens that are, at least to this date, not 
supported by the research. 
It is still up for debate whether animals which developed at an early evolutionary stage, such 
as fish, are able to experience pain (e.g., Key, 2015; Sneddon, 2015; Sneddon et al., 2014). 
Even if we accept this as given, the biological function of pain in fish cannot plausibly be the 
representation of tissue damage and its physiological properties. The system that is most likely 
associated with the generation of pain in such animals is also affected by factors other than 
tissue damage, given that even fish possess an endogenous opioid system (Machin, 2001; 
Wolkers et al., 2013). This system has been shown to be responsible for the lack of perfect 
                                                          
11 In reply, one might argue that it is better to have a system that produces many misfires with significant biological 
costs than to have no system for the representation of damage at all. For example, the chance of survival of patients 
suffering from pathological pains is still higher than that of people suffering from congenital analgesia (e.g., 
Nagasako, Oaklander, & Dworkin, 2003). However, it remains questionable that this is in fact the default strategy 




correspondence between the sensory properties of pain and the physiological properties of 
tissue damage in mammals. Consequently, strong representationalists must appeal to insects or 
invertebrates. However, it currently appears empirically impossible to decide whether such 
animals experience pain or not. 
In sum, pains prove to be adaptive in multiple ways, many of which are independent of the 
veridical representation of tissue damage. By defining the biological function of pain as the 
veridical representation of tissue damage, too many pains must be considered pathological or 
at least as failing to contribute to the biological benefit that pain was naturally designed to 
provide. Considerations of a “better-safe-than-sorry” principle or evolutionary exaptation are 
either implausible or carry significant empirical burdens. 
 
4. Itches, Hunger, and Sexual Feelings 
The considerations set out above are consistent with the view that pain is a unique case and 
that other bodily sensations do not produce the same problems for strong representationalism. 
In this section, I consider other bodily sensations in order to show that they are equally 
challenging. 
Strong representationalists rarely offer a clear characterization of the bodily conditions that 
sensations other than pain, such as itches, hunger, and sexual feelings, are supposed to 
represent. They are often described merely as some sort of physiological changes taking place 
in certain parts of the body, such as the skin, stomach, or genitals (Tye, 2007). This is not 
incidental. For itches, hunger, or sexual feelings, there is a clear lack of immediately plausible 
candidates for the bodily conditions to be represented by the corresponding bodily sensation. 
Of course, strong representationalists can respond that it is up to empirical research to reveal 
the bodily conditions that are causally and biologically connected to the relevant phenomenal 
experiences. However, again, empirical research indicates a heterogeneity of causes and 
biological functions which prevent the fixation of an intentional content that determines the 
corresponding phenomenal character.  
First, we might best identify itches with the representation of some sort of skin irritation that 
is, in contrast to pains, not related to any actual or potential damage. However, itches can have 
multiple causes, and many of them do not, even on a charitable reading, correspond to this 
description. Itches can be caused by substances secreted by animals and plants, dermal 
infections and inflammations, allergens, drugs, neural disorders, or psychopathologies (Lavery 




multimodal signals (Azimi, Xia, & Lernera, 2016) as well as by psychological factors (Han & 
Dong, 2014; Misery et al., 2018). Moreover, the causal and biological properties of itches are 
primarily characterized in terms of the scratching behavior that itches elicit and not in terms of 
a preceding bodily condition that might reliably co-vary with itches (Lavery et al., 2016; 
Mochizuki & Kakigi, 2015). The scratching behavior elicited by the itch might be decisive for 
its adaptive benefit, rather than the physiological condition that causes the sensation (Hall, 
2008). For example, scratching might be beneficial, as it removes substances from the skin’s 
surface that are poisonous, irritating, or searing. 
Second, given its introspectable features, hunger might best represent contractions of the 
stomach walls which relate to the emptiness of the organ (Tye, 2007). On the contrary, the 
amount of stomach contents is not a decisive factor for the experience of hunger. The biological 
function of hunger seems to be grounded in energy balancing, which is related to various 
relevant factors, such as blood sugar level, hormone levels, olfactory signals, stress, and 
environmental conditions (Amin & Mercer, 2016; Burger, Sanders, & Gilbert, 2016; Huh et 
al., 2015; Mayer, 1996). Meanwhile, hunger cannot simply represent a low energy level, at 
least not if the intentional content is supposed to account for the felt location of hunger. 
References to a low energy level fail to explain why hunger is experienced as being located in 
the stomach, which is just one organ that is sensitive to, for example, the subject’s blood sugar 
or hormone levels. By contrast, it might be, again, that the behavior elicited by hunger plays 
the decisive role for its biological function: the search for and ingestion of nutrition (e.g., Klein, 
2015). 
Third, orgasms, or sexual feelings in general, constitute a particularly interesting case. 
Orgasms and other sexual feelings can be caused by the mechanical stimulation of sensory 
areas with a high density of receptors found, for example, in genitals. This corresponds to the 
fact that they are experienced as being located mainly in these body parts. However, orgasms 
can be caused by the mechanical stimulation of various other body parts, as well as by dreams, 
drugs, or the imagination (Komisaruk & Whipple, 2011). In addition, orgasms and sexual 
feelings are highly affected by a variety of psychological factors (e.g., Brotto et al., 2016; 
Nekoolaltak et al., 2017). Most importantly, their biological function is clearly not grounded 
in the representation of a particular bodily condition, such as the sensory stimulation of a 
particular body part. Representations of mechanical stimulation fail to account for the actual 
biological function of orgasms and sexual feelings, which are related to maximizing 





In sum, bodily sensations, such as pain, hunger, itches, or sexual feelings constitute a 
challenge for the strong representationalist who aims to justify the introduction of a 
corresponding intentional content by appealing to external relations of reliable causal 
covariance or biological function. While every bodily sensation can have its own 
characteristics, the heterogeneity of their causes and biological functions is the primary factor 
that prevents the fixation of a corresponding intentional content which determines their 
phenomenal character. Strong representationalists fail to account for the fact that bodily 
sensations are the product of a heterogeneous class of physiological and psychological factors. 
Meanwhile, their biological functions often have no direct connection to the veridical 
representation of a particular bodily condition. By contrast, the previous considerations indicate 
that the actions elicited by bodily sensations play a more significant role. Similar issues might 
occur in the investigation of thirst, dyspnea, or thermal sensations. 
 
5. Possible Responses 
In reply to my objections, strong representationalists might rely on a few different strategies. 
In this section, I will discuss the most promising. Each of them allows strong 
representationalists to avoid some of the previously discussed issues, but at a high price. In 
particular, each strategy diminishes the intuitive plausibility of the strong representationalist 
view. 
First, strong representationalism might define the intentional content of bodily sensations in 
terms of a disjunctive list of all those bodily conditions that are causally and biologically related 
to them, but not to other bodily sensations. For example, one might assume that pain represents 
actual tissue damage or potential tissue damage or certain disorders of the central nervous 
system or some metabolic processes or something else along those lines. We might relate itches 
to the representation of poisonous substances or irritating substances or dermal infections or 
particular neural disorders or something along those lines. We might even extend this 
disjunction to include combinations of these bodily conditions and relevant psychological 
factors. This solution allows strong representationalists to account for the heterogeneity of the 
causes and biological functions of bodily sensations. However, it is in tension with the main 
motivation of strong representationalism. Strong representationalism aims to identify a 
particular objective condition that pains or itches might represent in order to account for their 




Second, strong representationalists might attempt to alter the intentional content of bodily 
sensations. As the most prominent example, one might assume that bodily sensations do not 
represent objective bodily conditions but, rather, the subjective relevance of certain stimuli. 
This solution seems attractive at first glance, but it leads to a serious demarcation problem.12 
We will consider this strategy first with respect to pain, then itches and hunger, and then sexual 
feelings. 
One might assume that pain does not represent tissue damage but an actual or potential 
harm. This alternative interpretation of the intentional content of pain is roughly based on a 
strategy developed by Christopher Hill (2012). According to this approach, the intensity of pain 
does not represent the severity of a stimulus, but its degree of harm, that is, the degree to which 
a stimulus impairs the proper biological functioning of an organism. To which degree a 
stimulus harms the proper biological functioning of an organism might depend on multiple 
factors, including sensory and psychological aspects. For example, tissue damage of a certain 
severity can impair the proper functioning of an organism in different manners depending on 
whether the organism is located in a safe or a dangerous environment. Thus, the excitatory or 
inhibitory influence of multisensory signals or psychological factors on pain intensity need not 
be considered as debilitating or distorting because they contribute to the representation of more 
or less harm in a veridical and biologically beneficial manner.  
In accordance with this interpretation, we might also assume that pain represents different 
bodily conditions that are in some way or another harmful for the physiological well-being of 
a subject, even if they are not directly related to actual or potential damage. For example, we 
might interpret muscle pains as indicating the exertion of relevant resources which could, in 
the long run, lead to harm by preventing survival-relevant activities, such as fight or flight 
reactions. Moreover, one might assume that the location of harm could vary to a certain degree 
from the location of a corresponding bodily cause, such as in the case of visceral pains. Even 
if only a certain part of the intestinal system is inflamed, this inflammation might harm the 
proper functioning of the larger area in which the pain is experienced. In this way, the number 
of non-veridical cases shrinks significantly. 
Interestingly, this strategy can also be applied to itches and hunger. Contact with poisonous 
or otherwise intolerable substances, as well as inflammations and irritations of the skin, are 
harmful for the subject. Moreover, on this interpretation, we can account for the influence of 
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psychological factors on itches. Most prominently, itches are highly contagious: subjects tend 
to experience itches when they see other people performing scratching behavior (Misery et al., 
2018). We might explain this fact by positing that the behaviors of others constitute social cues 
for a potential harm in the environment, such as the presence of certain plants or insects. 
Similarly, we might posit that a subject’s blood sugar level or environmental conditions 
constitute indicators for the physiological harms of malnutrition or starving while hunger 
promotes the subject’s protection from exactly this harm. 
What might first appear as an advantage constitutes a serious problem. Pain, itches, and 
hunger all appear to be related to harmful conditions that affect the subject’s physiological 
well-being in a more or less proximate sense. Following the outlined approach, considerations 
concerning reliable causal covariance and biological function show that the intentional contents 
of multiple bodily sensations collapse in the representation of actual or potential harm. 
Phenomenal differences between pain, hunger, and itches thus cannot be explained in terms of 
their intentional content. This conclusion contradicts the main assumption of strong 
representationalism that every difference in phenomenology relies on a corresponding 
difference in intentionality. Thus, the suggested intentional content of bodily sensations fails 
to account either for the heterogeneity of their respective causes and biological functions, or 
for the phenomenal differences between pain, hunger, and itches. 
A similar problem might occur in the case of orgasms and sexual feelings, as the fixation of 
a concrete intentional content is a balancing act between the problem of heterogeneity and the 
problem of demarcation. On the one hand, the intentional content must be flexible enough to 
do justice to the influence of various physiological and psychological factors. This condition 
must be fulfilled if the intentional content is to be motivated by arguments of reliable causal 
covariance and biological function. On the other hand, the intentional content needs to account 
for sensory features, such as felt bodily location, and distinguish the relevant bodily sensations 
from closely related, though not identical phenomena, such as romantic affection. 
Third, one might object that I have presupposed a misguided version of representationalism 
and that the objections raised above can be avoided by other versions of representationalism. 
On the one hand, one might defend a weak version of representationalism (e.g., Block, 1990). 
According to this view, the intentional content does not exhaust the phenomenal character of 
an experience. That is, similarities and differences in phenomenology might not be exclusively 
grounded in similarities and differences in intentionality. Various challenges to strong 




need not perfectly match the features of a certain physiological condition. However, this would 
lose one of the main advantages of strong representationalism: the naturalization of bodily 
sensations in terms of an intentional content that essentially and exhaustively determines their 
phenomenal character. 
On the other hand, one might hold the position of strong representationalism while including 
intentional modes. The phenomenal character of bodily sensations would then be exhausted by 
their intentional content in combination with their intentional mode, that is, the particular 
manner in which the content is presented to the subject (Crane, 2003). For example, pains and 
itches might possess the same intentional content presented under different modes. This would 
solve the demarcation problem. However, we are then left to wonder why we should assume 
that different bodily sensations are related to different intentional modes. In particular, if 
arguments of reliable causal covariance and biological function are relevant, then significantly 
more work needs to be done to empirically ground such a theoretical move. 
A convincing argument could rely on evidence showing that sensory signals from the same 
region in the body are processed in different manners and lead to different bodily sensations. 
We could then relate differences in intentional mode to differences in the neural processing 
causing the respective sensations. While the assumption that visual and bodily sensations come 
along with different intentional modes is quite convincing (e.g., Bain, 2003), it is questionable 
whether corresponding evidence can be found in the direct comparison of bodily sensations. 
For example, pains and itches cannot, in large part at least, be distinguished in terms of the 
sensory processing causing the respective experiences. Pains and itches rely on the activity of 
similar receptors and are processed in the same network of anatomically defined neural 
structures (Forster & Handwerker, 2014; Iannetti & Mouraux, 2010; Mochizuki & Kakigi, 
2015).13  
Fourth, one might object that the versions of strong representationalism discussed and, 
accordingly, my analysis too rely on a false presumption concerning the phenomenal character 
of bodily sensations. That is, there might be no unique phenomenal character shared by all 
experiences of pain, itches, and hunger. This assumption may be interpreted in two ways.  
On the one hand, one might assume that pain, itches, and hunger actually have the same 
phenomenal character. Consequently, strong representationalists can account for their 
phenomenology in reference to the same intentional content, such as the representation of 
                                                          
13 The question of whether the introduction of distinct intentional modes for different bodily sensations is 
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physiological harm. As stated in the introduction, I accept that pain, itches, and hunger typically 
share the same negative affective valence. I merely assume that they differ in the sense that 
they are experienced as distinct bodily sensations. While humans might fail, in some cases, to 
clearly distinguish hunger from stomachache, or an itch from superficial healing pain, their 
phenomenal character at large is not identical. One might thus rephrase the conclusion of my 
investigations as a conditional: if strong representationalists accept that bodily sensations differ 
in terms of their unique phenomenal character, then their arguments from reliable causal 
covariance and biological function fail to plausibly motivate the introduction of different 
intentional contents for each. 
On the other hand, one might assume that those cases which are considered to be 
instantiations of the same bodily sensation do not share a common phenomenal character. 
According to this view, different types of pain are not phenomenologically unified and, as such, 
they are determined by different intentional contents. The assumption that pains share a 
phenomenal character seems to be part of the common ground shared with strong 
representationalists who use the pains of burns, toothaches, backaches, headaches, and 
phantom pains as exemplary instantiations of the same mental phenomenon (Bain, 2007; Bain 
& Brady, 2014; Tye, 1997). Again, the resulting conclusion can be stated conditionally: if 
strong representationalists accept that these cases share a phenomenal character, then their 
arguments from reliable causal covariance and biological function fail to plausibly motivate 
the introduction of a common intentional content. The same argument applies, in a similar 
manner, to other bodily sensations. 
Fifth, one might altogether reject the claim that the intentional content of bodily sensations 
represents an objective condition in the world. This idea underlies theories of strong 
imperativism (Klein, 2015, 2017). Strong imperativism claims that the phenomenal character 
of bodily sensations is essentially and exhaustively determined by an intentional content, but 
this intentional content demands the performance of certain actions. Strong imperativism is 
attractive for multiple reasons. It preserves the advantage of providing a naturalistic theory of 
the phenomenal character of bodily sensations. It also avoids the objections previously outlined 
because it does not presuppose a reliable causal or biological connection between bodily 
sensations and particular bodily conditions. Moreover, strong imperativism highlights the 
motivational aspects of bodily sensations. This corresponds to previous insights indicating that 
the biological benefit of pain, hunger, itches, and sexual feelings might significantly rely on 




Whether or not strong imperativism constitutes a plausible theory of pain and other bodily 
sensations cannot be discussed within the scope of this paper (see Coninx, 2020b). For now, it 
is sufficient to acknowledge that strong imperativism avoids the problems of strong 
representationalism while preserving its advantages. It constitutes a serious opponent. Strong 
imperativists challenge strong representationalists not merely with respect to the sensory 
features of bodily sensations (Klein, 2015, 2017), which have been the focus of this paper, but 
also with respect to their affective features (Barlassina & Hayward, 2019). However, it is 
important to note that, in adopting strong imperativism, one rejects strong representationalism. 
Finally, it would also be conceivable to combine elements of strong representationalism and 
strong imperativism (Martínez, 2011). For now, it remains questionable whether the problems 
of representationalist theories can thereby be fully avoided. An at least partial abandonment of 
the core ideas of strong representationalism seems unavoidable. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has aimed to show, against common intuitions, that arguments from reliable causal 
covariance and biological function do not favor a strong representationalist interpretation of 
bodily sensations. In particular, we have seen that pain, hunger, itches, and sexual feelings are 
related to a heterogeneous class of causes and biological functions. Various responses available 
to the strong representationalist were then considered. Some directly contradicted strong 
representationalism while others rejected assumptions that are common among its defenders, 
for example, those concerning the phenomenology of bodily sensations. We found that the 
most promising responses which are available to the strong representationalists require 
significantly more empirical proof than currently offered in order to ground strong 
representationalist arguments. It remains questionable whether such proof can be provided in 
the future. As a final move, one might altogether forsake the project of justifying the 
assumptions of strong representationalism with reference to the external relations between 
bodily sensations and conditions of the body. Whether or not other arguments can motivate the 
introduction of corresponding intentional contents must be the subject of further discussion. 
This is also the case for the question of whether alternative theories, such as strong 
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